INTRODUCTION
Internet is becoming more and more user centric each day. With the advent of web 2.0 internet users are becoming more inclined to use services from multiple content and service providers (CSP or SP). Most SPs provide user registration service whereby a user can create his/her own account and maintain it. As such a user has to maintain separate user accounts (username and password) for each of the SPs he/she uses. A study shows that today a typical user needs to maintain about twenty five different accounts which require password and uses eight of them in a given day [1] . Not only is this approach annoying to the user, it also raises some serious security questions, e.g. password fatigue [1] .
Single sign-on(SSO) is one approach which aims to address the root cause of this problem [2] . With single sign-on, a user can create one account and use that account to login once and use multiple services hosted in different domains. There are three components or actors of a single sign-on system. A IdP or "identity Provider", a "Service Provider" (SP) or "Relying Party" (RP) and the user. RP relies on IdP(s) to authenticate user credentials. SSO approach outsources the responsibility of user authentication from service providers to IdPs. Not only does SSO reduces the burden of the user, a SSO system can also enable users to share contents between different service providers [3] . Many commercial solutions exist which provide SSO service, such as OpenID [4] , Information Card [5] and SAML [6] based SSO Shibboleth.
In the next section we will go through these models and see their limitations. 
A. Existing Systems
Shibboleth : Shibboleth is an open source single sign-on solution which is best suited for portal or Intranet applications [7] . It uses Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), an OASIS specification for xml based security assertions. There are two main components of shibboleth system namely "Identity Provider" (IdP) and "Service Provider" (Sp).
In this system if a user wants to access a service or a resource of a SP, the SP redirects the user's web browser to a W A YF server. W A YF server displays a set of organizations to the user from which the user chooses one. Once the user chooses an organization, user's browser is redirected to corresponding login page of IdP and user provides his login credentials. Once the user successfully logs in, user's browser is redirected back to SP who decides whether to enable access for this user or not.
OpenID: OpenID [4] provides a user centric authentication model in a sense user can chose to implement hislher own OpenID provider or selects from a list of existing OpenID providers. Main components of an OpenID system are User Agent, Relying Party (RP) and OpenID Provider (IdP).
User initiates the authentication process with RP using "User Agent". RP then, depending of user provided identifier, discovers user's IdP and redirects "User Agent" to IdP with an authentication request. User performs authentication at IdP side with username/password and IdP then redirects "User Agent" to RP again with a security assertion message specitying whether authentication has succeeded or failed. Based on this assertion RP decides whether to grant the user permission to access its services or not.
Major advantage of OpenID is it doesn't require any pre established contract between RPs and IdPs. But it is susceptible to phishing attack [8] .
Information Card: Information Card is based on real world multi identity concept [9] . Like Driving license, passport etc an Information Card user can have different identity sectors. Each sector contains a different assertion which can be provided by different identity providers. When a user accesses services from a RP he/she logins in with one of the identity sectors or cards instead of username/password, with rest of the identity sectors remains hidden from RP.
Microsoft Cardspace is a SSO solution from Microsoft based on information card approach [1 0]. Information card approach provides more flexibility than username/password approach. As the information cards or sectors can be encrypted, it is also more secure than simple username/password. But with respect to Open 10, it is a very heavy system. Different Information Card identity sectors are stored in user computer which makes it susceptible to various security/privacy issues [8) .
B.
Phishing Vulnerability in SSG Whoever there are certain security limitations of SSO systems. SSO involves crossing security domains between different SPs. Moreover most IdPs rely on username/password as their preferred authentication method. And as such it is susceptible to phishing attacks [II] [12] [13).
From the above discussion, login procedure of most of the Single Sign-On systems can be generalized to a set of common steps [14) . At the first phase user establishes unique identity by registering to an IdP. At the second phase user accesses services provided by different RPs by the following steps:
1.
User requests a Service Provider or Relaying Party (say RPI) to access services provided by the RPI. RPI initiates the SSO process.
2.
RPI redirects the request to Identity Provider (IdPI) in order to authenticate the user.
3. User authentication is done by username/password method or certificates.
4.
IdPI asserts user credentials to RPl by sending an application ticket (AuthToken 1) or assertion.
5.
Based on the assertions RP decides whether to provide service to the user or not.
6.
If the user wants to access services from another service provider RP2, RPI will forward AuthToken 1 to RP2. RP2 then can verity user credentials with IdPI just by sending AuthToken 1 to IdPl. User doesn't need to provide his/her credentials again.
Fugure I. provides the pictorial representation of the steps. It is at stage 2 & 3 that the system is susceptible to phishing. Malicious RP can display a phishing page and as the user enters hislher username and password, RP can obtain details about user credentials. Since there is no way for the user to authenticate RP, he/she becomes vulnerable to phishing attack[IS).
As can be seen most of the SSO systems are susceptible to "verifier impersonation" or phishing attacks as they use password for credential verifIcation [16) . Phishing is a major issue in today's internet oriented life which causes massive financial loss every year[I7). It is therefore important to prevent phishing in SSO.
In the next section we will see previous works that have been done to prevent phishing in SSO systems.
III. PREVIOUS WORKS NO ANTI PHISHING MECHANISM FOR SSO
Various client side solutions exist which can detect a phishing page. E.g. Personal icon from myOpenID which can be used on a particular user's PC only. Solutions are provided by Veri sing (Validation Certificate for IE7 and seatbelt for Firefox) but they are browser dependent and not cost effective.
An improved SSO solution has been proposed by [18] based on Kerberos [19) . This model uses two passwords instead of one, one by authentication server and one by ticket granting server. Although this model adds one extra level of security, it is of little help to prevent phishing in a distributed web applications. Phishing web pages can be created to simulate this two phase approach and obtain both the passwords.
Another approach is to use mobile SIM in authentication phase of a SSO [20) . As proposed in this model, during login phase SIM is authenticated and proof of authentication is presented to the identity provider (IdP). IdP then lets the user login successfully. One drawback of this approach is that the authentication is carried out at the client side.
Lee & Jeun proposed a new approach to address the issue of phishing in SS0 [15] . Every time user wants to access the service from a RP, a new token will be generated and will be sent to the user's email address. User then can login with the token. Although it solves the phishing problem, this solution breaks the basic philosophy of SSO. User needs to sign on to hislher email first to access the generated token. It can be thought of a SISO (single identity sign on) as it requires users to sign in twice.
You & Jun proposed a solution to phishing problem in SSO by using I-PIN [21] . But this solution can't be implemented globally.
We believe one possible solution to phishing problem in SSO is to use a onetime password approach. In the next section we will propose our solution for SSO with onetime password scheme.
IV. PROPOSED SSO MODEL WITH ONETIME PASSWORD
Apart from addressing the issue of phishing in SSO, the new model should also be simple enough, so that it can be adopted in a real life scenario. In other words the proposed model should not introduce any new steps or complexity into the SSO process for the users. We will select our onetime password generation schema with these goals in mind.
PKI based onetime password generation model described by [22] provides good security features. But this model requires several additional steps during user registration and authentication phases.
For our proposed model we will make use of QR-code based onetime password schema [23] . Our idea is based on the assumption that most of the internet users today are erupted with a mobile phone that has a camera.
The proposed model has three entities: an Identity Provider (ldP), a Service Provider (SP) and a User (UA). The model is divided in two phases: User Registration and User Verification. Based on RP A, IdP calculates a key XA using a one way hash function.
3.
IdP sends XA to user's mobile device and it gets stored as a secret key. User Verification Phase 2. Return XA
1.
User wants to access a service provided by SP. 2.
SP redirects user to its IdP.
3.
User provides hislher identity to IdP.
4.
IdP then based on user's identity calculates XA• IdP uses XA and a random number to calculate the QR code EQR.
5.
IdP then sends EQR and a timestamp Tl to the user. 6.
User uses the embedded camera in hislher mobile device and stored XA to decode the QR code to DQR. DQR and timestamp T2 are then sent to the IdP. 7.
IdP checks the validity of DQR and acceptability of T2 and based on that sends a security assertion to SP. 8.
SP then, based on the security assertion can allow on deny use of its services. 9 .
If the user now wants to access services from another service provider (SPI), SP can forward the assertion token to SPI maintaining the basic principles of SSO. Generation of the secret key XA should be dynamic, i.e, if the user's XA is compromised due to loose of mobile device or any other reason, he/she will be able to generate a new secret key.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. Phishing attack
Since the root password RPA is never disclosed during the verification phase, this model is fairly resistive to phishing [II] attacks. Further if the secret key XA is compromised at any stage, UA can change it by simply resetting RPA at the IdP side. Since XA is generated using one way hash function, it is unfeasible to derive RPA from XA.
B. Other attacks
Assuming timestamp difference (Tl-T2) acceptable by the IdP is minimum, If a man in the middle intercepts DQR and tries to emulate the user, timestamp of DQR would be expired. In [14] addition, as EQR is generated using a random number, after the allowed time interval IdP will select a new random number. Hence this model is fairly safe from both man in the middle [IS] attacks and reply attacks [23] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we went through a brief overview of SSO process and analyzed its vulnerability against phishing attacks. We then presented a new SSO model with mobile QR code based onetime password schema. Security analysis of our model shows that apart from preventing phishing attacks, our model is safe against man in the middle and reply attacks as well. Since most users today are equipped with camera embedded mobile device, this model can be adopted universally.
